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Abstract
This study analyzes the determinants of capital structure in the Turkish banking sec-
tor. We propose an empirical model in order to identify the factors that explain why
banks hold capital beyond the amount required by the regulation. We used a panel
data set that employs bank-level data from the Turkish banking sector covering the
period 2002–2006 and estimated the model with generalized method of moments
(GMM). The findings of this study suggest that lagged capital, portfolio risk, econom-
ic growth, average capital level of the sector and return on equity are positively corre-
lated with capital adequacy ratio and share of deposits are negatively correlated with
capital adequacy ratio.     
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Özet - Finansal Kurumlarda Sermaye Yap›s›n› Belirleyen Faktörler: 
Türkiye Örne¤i
Bu çal›ﬂmada Türk bankac›l›k sektöründe sermaye yap›s›n›n belirleyicileri analiz
edilmektedir. Bankalar›n düzenlemelerdekinden daha fazla sermaye tutmas›n› aç›k-
layacak de¤iﬂkenleri belirlemek için deneye dayal› bir model sunulmuﬂtur. Türk ban-
kac›l›k sektöründen 2002–2006 dönemini kapsayan banka düzeyinde veriler ile bir
panel veri seti oluﬂturulmuﬂtur. Model bu veriler kullan›larak genelleﬂtirilmiﬂ mo-
mentler metodu (GMM) ile tahmin edilmiﬂtir. Bulgular gecikmeli sermayenin, port-
föy riskinin, ekonomik büyümenin, sektörün ortalama sermayesinin, ve sermaye ge-
tirisinin tutulan sermaye ile pozitif iliﬂkili oldu¤unu; buna karﬂ›l›k varl›k büyüklü¤ünün
ve mevduat pay›n›n negatif iliﬂkili oldu¤unu göstermektedir.       
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sermaye Yeterlili¤i, Türk Bankac›l›k Sektörü, GMM.
JEL S›n›flamas›: G21, G28, C23.
* Expert, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
** Expert, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
The views expressed in this paper are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
911. Introduction
Determinants of capital structure in financial institutions differ from non-financi-
al institutions due to issues peculiar to these institutions. For banks, which constitu-
te the largest portion of financial institutions in Turkey, liabilities relating to legal ca-
pital regulations are the most important factors determining the capital structure.
Banks generally hold more capital than the minimum capital ratios required by
capital regulations that banks are obliged to meet. In general, this is explained by
the fact that banks tend to operate in a prudential manner against probable shocks.
However, recent studies demonstrate that factors that determine the capital adequ-
acy ratio are not only limited to legal liabilities, but variables specific to banks are
important in determining the level of capital.
We analyze the factors that determine the capital adequacy ratio in the Turkish
banking sector in this study. Turkish banks currently hold considerably more capital
than the regulatory minimum. By using a panel of bank-level data, we will empiri-
cally investigate the determinants of the capital adequacy ratio. We employ a dyna-
mic model and estimate it with generalized method of moments. The level of risk
assumed by a bank, asset size, alternative cost of capital, the share of deposits in
non-equity liabilities, the average capital adequacy of the whole sector, and growth
rates of the Turkish economy are the main variables that we employed in our reg-
ression analysis. We find that most of these variables are significant in explaining
why banks hold excess capital.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In the second section of this study,
we will examine the concept of capital structure in financial institutions. In the third
section, we will review the literature on the determinants of capital adequacy ratio
in banks and provide detail on the development of capital adequacy regulations. In
the fourth section, we will empirically analyze the determinants of capital adequacy
in the Turkish banking sector using regression analyses for private deposit banks for
the period 2002-2006. Finally we draw conclusions in the fifth section.
2. Capital Structure in Financial Institutions
Since the seminal paper of Modigliani & Miller (henceforth, M&M) in 1958, capital struc-
ture in companies has been among the most important topics in finance area. However,
the issue of capital structure in companies has not been resolved. There is not a compre-
hensive theory that is able to explain the decisions of companies on financial structure. For
financial companies,  the  literature on capital structure is very limited and the issue has not
been addressed for these companies for long years  (Marques and Santos, 2003).      
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structure in banks have not been established through empirical analysis. 
M&M theory argues that financing decisions cannot change the value of a com-
pany and the income of its shareholders under the assumption that markets are
complete, perfect and frictionless. The important point is that the theory focuses on
why the capital structure cannot change the value of the company rather than exp-
laining its capital structure. Berger et al. (1995) study capital theory in financial ins-
titutions and examine why markets are not frictionless in detail. They lay out the fun-
damental reasons for markets not being frictionless as follows:  a) Taxes and cost
of financial distress, b) Transaction costs and asymmetric information.
These factors are valid for all companies, whether financial or not. For example,
since interest payments reduce tax payments, but dividends do not have a similar
effect, banks will be encouraged to have more borrowing in financing structure. In-
creased borrowing and accordingly, cost of financial distress will change the opti-
mal capital structure. In such a case, capital structure will adjust such that the tax
impact of a 1-unit borrowing increase is equal to the cost of financial distress. In
another example from Berger et al. (1995), the authors demonstrate how asymmet-
ric information and transaction costs affect the decisions relating to internal versus
external finance. In this example, the information that bank managers have is not
known by investors and therefore, investors may be reluctant to financing through
new share issue. Transaction costs of issuing new shares may exacerbate this reluc-
tance. In another words, transaction costs together with asymmetric information
may affect the capital structure in a similar fashion to the cost of financial distress.
Berger et al. (1995) identify the above factors that affect the financing structure
of all companies, financial and non-financial alike. They identify “safety net” as a fac-
tor that is functional on the capital structure of financial institutions only. Different-
ly from non-financial companies, financial institutions are under protection by a sa-
fety net (practices such as deposit insurance system, payment guarantees, liquidity
window they have on the occasion of sudden liquidity shortage etc.) that enables
them to operate in a sound manner and they point to the importance of external
factors that affect the capital structure of financial institutions. 
Although the safety net can explain the difference in the capital structure of fi-
nancial institutions and other companies, probably the most important factor that
affects the capital structure of financial institutions is the legal capital requirements,
or the “capital adequacy ratio.”
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The Case of TurkeyThere are various studies in the literature that emphasize the importance of ca-
pital adequacy ratio on the capital structure of financial institutions. For example,
Osterberg and Thomson (1990) state that the capital structure of financial instituti-
ons differs from that of non-financial institutions and the impact of legal regulations
on such a difference cannot be ignored. Furthermore, they point out that the the-
oretical framework that is applied to the capital structure of non-financial instituti-
ons cannot be applied one-to-one to financial institutions due to regulations relating
to capital in financial institutions. Berger et al. (1995) state that the impact of legal
capital requirements on capital held by banks is very important. They provide empi-
rical evidence from the United States. The capital adequacy ratio, which was 6,21%
the end of 1989 increased to 8,01% in 1993 following the  enforcement of the le-
gal framework. Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) state that the United States banks in-
creased the proportion of low-risk government securities in their portfolios following
the introduction of legal capital requirements.
Consequently, financial institutions, unlike non-financial institutions, have signifi-
cant differences in capital structure for safety net reasons or their legal capital requ-
irements. Thus, the fundamental issue is to understand the capital structure in finan-
cial institutions and more importantly, capital adequacy ratio and the determinants
of this ratio.
3. Capital Adequacy Ratio and Its Determinants
3.1. Improvements in Capital Adequacy Regulations
Factors such as technological change, increased competition, and changes in cus-
tomer demand forced financial institutions to expand the range of products they of-
fer and improve their institutional structures. As a result, banks’ balance sheets ha-
ve become more complex and they are exposed to a wider set of risk.
Within this scope, it is critically important for stability that banks, which primarily
extend funding to the real sector using external resources they obtained mainly
from depositors, have the ability to manage these resources and the risks that ema-
nate from their operations. It can be argued that there is a suggestive relationship
between the quality of risk management of banks and the stability of the financial
system. Negative consequences of bad management of a bank could possibly jump
to other sectors of the economy and trigger economy-wide financial crises or dee-
pen ongoing fluctuations. Therefore, it is important that banks manage their risks
properly for the health of the whole economy. It has been adopted internationally
that banks abide by minimum prudential regulations and strengthen their risk ma-
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Capital adequacy regulations are deemed the most important quantitative instru-
ment used by supervisory authorities to protect the rights of customers and to en-
hance the stability of the financial system. Their functions are such as covering pos-
sible unexpected losses emanating from the risks undertaken, increasing credibility,
reducing the risk of systemic crises and creating a competitive environment.  
Within this scope, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a substruc-
ture under the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), set to work in order to eva-
luate the risks of banks that are active in international markets. In 1988, the “Capi-
tal Accord” named Basel I was published. It focused on the minimum capital to be
held by banks in order to minimize the costs to depositors in case a bank goes ban-
krupt. 
This regulation paved the way for the creation of international standards for ca-
pital adequacy. The Capital Accord defined capital for a bank and grouped its assets
according to their risk into four groups. These groups were given risk weights of
0%, 20%, 50% and 100% from least risky to most risky assets. The accord determi-
ned a lower limit of 8% for “Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio”. The accord was
adopted beyond internationally active banks and contributed dramatically to increa-
sing the capital adequacy ratios of banks throughout the world.
Over the course of time, the accord has been criticized by academics and large
banks from various aspects. Its one-size-fits–all approach to capital adequacy made
it difficult to apply it to banks with different fields of activities in the same manner.
Its risk susceptibility is low due to the limited risk weights it employed. However, the
simplicity of its standards facilitated the adoption of the accord especially by deve-
loping countries. It contributed to the modernization of regulations and increased
competition in financial sectors of these countries.
The capital adequacy ratio, also known as Cooke Ratio, has initially been able to
associate capital and risk and could measure capital both in monetary terms and as
a ratio. Nevertheless, this ratio has proved insufficient as derivative instruments be-
came more diversified and intensified, and off-balance sheet transactions were used
more commonly. As a consequence, the Basel Committee established a capital ade-
quacy sub group in order to address these issues. A report named as “The Supervi-
sory Treatment of Market Risks” was published in April 1993 as a result in order to
eliminate the deficiencies. The report stressed the necessity that banks hold suffici-
ent capital for market risks they incur on- and off-balance sheet that stem from the
changes in prices. Following the 1994 Mexican crisis, “Market Risk Assessment” was
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risks from open positions, securities, and derivative products into the definition of
capital adequacy. Market risks due to options were added for standard approaches
and internal models based approaches in April 1998. The first accord became more
sensitive to risk as a result of these efforts. 
These amendments did not resolve all issues with Basel I. The notion of capital
that was used in the risk based capital approach could not adequately explain a
bank’s capacity to compensate expected or unexpected losses. Risk criteria that we-
re employed were not satisfactory. The accord disregarded the differences in credit
risk in the risk assessment of assets. The Basel Committee’s efforts to resolve these
issues resulted in the publication of Consultation Paper 1 in 1999, which included
proposals on the new capital adequacy, and this study lead to the Basel II Accord.
The Basel Committee published the “New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) in June
2004 and revised it in November 2005. Basel II proposes fundamental improve-
ments in the calculation of capital adequacy in comparison to Basel I. On the other
hand, it emphasizes issues of supervision by authorities and market discipline. Imp-
lementation of Basel II requires special effort for both banks and supervisory autho-
rities. The new accord basically aims at establishing a stronger supervisory infrastruc-
ture, strengthening risk management, increasing market discipline and achieving a
globally sustainable financial stability. Within this scope, the New Accord is not so-
lely a set of rules to achieve international convergence of capital adequacy definiti-
on, but also an approach that encourages banking supervisory authorities to view
their financial systems with a wider perspective.
The new approach has three pillars: minimum capital requirements, prudential
supervision of supervisory authorities, and market discipline. The Basel committee
has modified some parts of the Basel Accord on minimum capital, and emphasized
that risk profiles of banks should be defined in a detailed fashion. One important
modification in this context is that, risk was defined more comprehensively to inclu-
de interest rate risk and operation risk. 
The second pillar of the capital adequacy framework is the supervision of the aut-
hority. This requires that the supervisory authority audits in such a way that banks’
capital is adequate in comparison to its risk profile and its strategies. The supervi-
sory authority is expected to intervene early in case a bank has insufficient capital
to cover its risks. The supervisory authority could require certain banks to maintain
levels of capital above the minimum capital adequacy ratio. Furthermore, the new
framework indicates that bank management should develop internal assessment of
capital and that it should set target capital levels parallel to the risk profile of the
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adequacy of the internal assessment procedures and conformity with the rules. 
The third pillar of the new accord is market discipline. It stipulates that market
participants should be able to assess the situation of a bank. In order for such an
assessment to be significant, banks should be sufficiently transparent to reveal the
necessary information in time. It is the responsibility of the supervisory authorities
to provide transparency.
Turkey acted quickly to include the first capital adequacy regulations into its na-
tional legislation and the Capital Adequacy Standard Ratio was put into effect gra-
dually starting in 1989. The market risk regulations that were introduced in 1996
and 1998 by the Basel Committee were put into practice in 2001 and 2002. 
The Banking Regulation and Supervision agency has taken important steps for
compliance with the Basel II and announced that Turkish banks will calculate capi-
tal adequacy according to the Basel II rules starting in 2009.(1)
3.2. Determinants of Capital Adequacy 
Although many studies in the literature addressed the issue of determinants of cap-
ital adequacy of firms in general, there is not much research on the capital structure
of banks. This is probably due to the fact that banks are structurally and functionally
different from the non-financial sector. More recently, the determinants of capital ade-
quacy ratios have received attention rather than the capital structures of banks.
Below, we summarize the factors that affect capital, based on the findings in the
literature.
(a) Risk Level:
In banking, one of the most important determinants of capital is related to the
risk that banks have taken. Legal regulations relate the level of capital that  banks
must maintain with the level of risks that they carry. The main reason of this is that
capital is viewed as a shield against unexpected losses and bankruptcy. The level of
risk taken in banking can be measured by the share of the risk weighted assets in
the bank’s total assets (RISK= Risk Weighted Assets/ Total Assets).
The relation between portfolio risk and capital adequacy in banking is expected
to be negative. Normally, increasing risk level would require a higher level of capi-
tal. However, the difference between the perception of risk of banks and the per-
ception of risk of supervisory authorities can sometimes cause that this relation to
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(1) See the announcement at http://www.bddk.org.tr/turkce/Duyurular/Basin_Aciklamalari/349623
_07_2007.pdfbe positive. In other words, the assets that regulators find risky for banks could be
seen not as risky by the managers (Wong et al. 2005). One other factor that can
cause this negative relationship is the deposits insurance system. This system can
increase the risk appetite of banks (Alfon et al. 2004).
(b) Asset Size:
In banking, level of risk is a relative concept. In order to understand in which level
a bank takes risks, the asset size of a bank should also be taken into account. The
general opinion is that asset size is inversely related to capital adequacy. For exam-
ple, Kleff and Weber (2003) assert that large banks could maintain less capital due
to their advantage in covering their capital requirements from external sources rel-
atively easily. They also claim that capital requirements of large banks are lower,
because they have less investment opportunities and that their portfolios are diver-
sified to a large extent. 
Wong et al. (2005) assert that risk management techniques of banks with large
asset size are more developed than those of smaller banks. This provides some
advantages to large banks in measuring the risks of borrowers through scale effect,
and thus, they require less capital.
Alfon et al. (2004) claim that the main reason for small banks to maintain high-
er capital levels than larger banks is their aim to finance their long run business strat-
egy. Since it is more costly for small banks to adjust their capital in case of a sud-
den capital requirement, they choose to carry more capital.
Therefore, inflation-adjusted asset size will be used as an independent variable
for the regression analyses of the Turkish banking sector.
(c) Capital Adequacy of Previous Period:
The adjustment cost described above does not only vary across size. The capital
adequacy of previous period is one of the factors that determine the cost of adjust-
ment. Keeping too much capital can be a matter of concern in terms of profitabili-
ty and efficiency, but an insufficient amount of capital could generate more nega-
tive results. Consequently, banks adjust capital by more than the minimum required
amount. Therefore, the capital amount banks want to maintain in the current peri-
od can be associated with the capital amount of the previous period.
(d) Alternative Cost of the Capital:
One of the main determinants of capital that firms hold is the alternative cost of
capital, in banking sector and the rest of the economy.
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to hold more capital. Holding excess capital does not have a large effect on prof-
itability when cost of capital is low. As the most suitable indicator of alternative cost
of the capital for banks is return on equity (ROE), it will be used in the regression
analyses. ROE is adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.
(e) Share of Deposits in Non-equity Liabilities:
Deposits are generally considered cheaper sources of funds compared to borrow-
ing and similar financing instruments (such as financing by bond or syndication and
securitization loans) for banks (Kleff and Weber 2003). Therefore, a decrease in the
share of deposits in total liabilities creates a cost effect by increasing share the bor-
rowed financing sources. As increasing cost can decrease the profitability of  banks,
banks will be in need of capital to compensate for this decrease.
Moreover, since creditors determine the risk premia by taking the capital adequa-
cy ratio into consideration while lending to banks, this causes an increase in the
amount of capital held by banks. Banks that do not want to experience an increase
in the risk premia and a possible decrease in profitability generally prefer to have a
capital adequacy ratio that is above the rate determined by regulations (Alfon et al.
2004).
Accordingly, one of the factors determining the capital adequacy for the banks
is the share of deposits in their liabilities. In order to understand the effect of the
share of deposits on capital adequacy, the share of deposits in non-equity liabilities
is used as a variable in the regression analysis.
(f) The Average Capital Adequacy of the Sector:
It is not possible for the market participants to have the detailed information that
supervisory authorities and private supervision companies have. For this reason, it
can be argued that high capital adequacy will act as a signaling mechanism for the
banks that want to change the perception of the market participants and rating
companies positively (Alfon et al. 2004).
In order to see this signaling effect, we will use the average capital adequacy of
the sector as an explanatory variable.
(g) Capital Adequacy Regulatory Pressure
In the literature, regulatory pressure is mentioned as another factor that may
affect the capital adequacy ratio of banks. Capital adequacy regulatory pressure is
the obligation to comply with the minimum capital adequacy ratios determined by
regulatory and supervisory authorities. 
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banks is the regulatory pressure of the capital adequacy. However, while there is
only one minimum capital adequacy ratio for all the banks in Turkey, in some coun-
tries banking regulation and supervision agencies determine minimum capital ade-
quacy ratios on a bank by bank basis. For example, the study of Alfon et al. (2004)
indicate that banks in the United Kingdom face an individual capital adequacy
requirement, and Wong et al. (2005) state that the capital adequacy ratio for the
banks in Hong Kong banking system is determined in a similar fashion.
There is only one obligatory capital adequacy ratio in Turkey and most banks
operate with excess capital. Therefore, this variable is not employed in our regres-
sion analyses of the Turkish banking sector. 
(h) Economic Growth: 
The last factor to be considered in explaining the capital adequacy ratio is eco-
nomic growth. In periods of positive economic growth, expectations are positive for
banks as well as most other sectors of the economy and risks are relatively low.
However, when economic growth rate is negative, banks may suffer sudden capital
losses as a result of possible risk realizations. For this reason, banks generally tend
to work with more capital in periods when expectations on the economy turn to
negative. Having more capital may reduce the negative effects of the economic
environment by signaling a strong capital structure. It may also limit the negative
effects of adjustment costs that tend to increase in these periods. We employed the
growth rate of gross domestic product in our regression analyses.
4. Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Capital Adequacy in the 
Turkish Banking Sector
4.1. Data
We employed bank-level monthly data from the Turkish banking sector for the
period December 2002-April 2006. Banking data for the pre-December 2002 period
are unreliable. There were not good accounting standards among banks before this
time. Financial statements of the banks were not transparent and the regulatory
and supervisory environment was not developed sufficiently to be comparable with
international financial system.  This factor makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
adjust the previous data to make them comparable to the data collected after-
wards. In addition, we excluded banks with excessively high capital adequacy
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banks have been restructured by injecting government debt instruments after the
economic crisis of 2001. Therefore, the factors that determine their capital adequa-
cy are different from the rest of the sector because of this intervention. After this
selection, our final sample contains 20 banks.
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are displayed in Table 1. The
average bank in the sample has a capital adequacy ratio of 19 percent and the share
of its risk-weighted assets in total assets is 64.6 percent. The share of deposits in
total non-equity liabilities is around 65 percent. The average real return on equity
was close to -6 during the sample period. The average quarterly growth rate in the
sample period was 1.74 percent. The average capital adequacy ratio of the all bank-
ing sector (including those that are excluded from our estimation sample) was
around 27 percent.
Means of variables are presented in Table 2 by year. Average capital adequacy
of the banks in the sample has been decreasing over time. It was around 21 per-
cent in 2002 and around 16 percent at the end of 2006. The share of deposits in
non-equity liabilities decreased from 72 percent to 63 percent from 2002 to 2006.
Although the real return on equity is negative for most of the sample period, we
observe an improvement over time. Portfolio risk, measured as the share of risk-
weighted assets in total assets, has increased from 54 percent in 2002 to 69 per-
cent in 2006. We also see an increase in the real size of assets of the sector in the
sample period.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(2) In particular, banks with capital adequacy ratio greater than 40 are excluded from the sample.Table 3 displays the correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression
analyses. Portfolio risk, size of assets, share of deposit and the return on equity are
negatively correlated with our dependent variable, capital adequacy ratio. Lagged
capital, growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) of the economy and capital
adequacy of whole sector (deposit banks) is positively correlated with capital ade-
quacy.
4.2. The Model
Banks adjust capital so as to achieve a desired level of capital. Following Kleff and
Weber (2006), this can be written as
Δcapitalj,t = α[capital*j,t - capitalj,t-1] + εj,t (1)
where Δcapitalj,t = capitalj,t - capitalj,t-1
This equation shows how the adjustment is made. If the managers observe that
capital in the last period (capitalj,t-1) falls below the desired level (capital*j,t) they will
increase the capital in the current period so that Δcapitalj,t is positive. The coefficient
in front of the adjustment term (α) measures the speed of adjustment. If the value
of α high, it means that managers respond strongly to deviations from the desired
level of capital.
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Table 2: Means of variables by year
Table 3: Correlation matrix for the variablesWe can write the above equation as
capitalj,t = (1-α) capitalj,t-1 + α capital*j,t + εj,t (2)
Since the target level of capital is not observed, we use proxy variables for the
unobserved variable capital*. We use portfolio risk, return on equity, growth rate of
gross domestic product, asset size, and ratio of deposits in total non-equity liabilities
as proxy variables for the target level of capital.
4.3. Empirical Specification
We specify the desired level of capital as follows:
capital*j,t=δ0+δ1riskj,t+δ2roej,t+δ3depositj,t+δ4gdp1+δ5avcapt+δ6assetj,t+uj,t         (3)
where capital is the capital adequacy ratio for bank j at time t, risk is the share
of risk-weighted assets in total assets, roe is the inflation-adjusted return on equity,
deposit is the share of deposits in non-equity liabilities, gdp is the quarterly growth
rate of gross domestic product, avcap is the average capital adequacy ratio of the
sector, and asset is the size of assets adjusted by the consumer price index.
The error term in the adjustment equation (Equation 1) is split into two parts.
The first part is a bank specific component that is constant across time for a bank.
The second part is a random term that varies across time and banks. We treat the
bank-specific terms as fixed effects. We differenced out these fixed effects so that
the problem of the correlation between the bank specific term and the endogenous
explanatory variables can be remedied. After differencing out the bank fixed effect
the error term and the endogenous explanatory variables are still correlated.
Therefore, we need valid instruments for these variables. Three explanatory vari-
ables, portfolio risk, return on equity and the lagged value of the dependent vari-
able are treated as potentially endogenous. There may be two-way causality
between these variables and the capital that a bank holds. A bank may decide how
much risk to take and how much capital to carry simultaneously. Similarly, a bank
with higher capital may have lower profitability, which in turn causes lower return
on equity. The instrumentation procedure that we followed in this study is due to
Arellano and Bond (1991). We instrument for the endogenous variables using their
lagged values from two lags to four lags. Although it is possible to use more lags
as instruments, it is not usually recommended since using too many instrumental
variables can increase the bias in the estimates (Hahn and Hausman 2002).
In order to check the relevance of our instrumental variables, we did a series of
first stage regression diagnostics. Results from the first stage estimation suggest
that our instruments are relevant in explaining the endogenous explanatory vari-
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ments and the error terms be uncorrelated. When we have more instruments than
endogenous explanatory variables, we can test this using Hansen’s J statistic. The
null hypothesis is the correct specification of the model and the orthogonality con-
ditions. Hansen’s J statistic reveals that the model and the instruments are admissi-
ble. There is no significant correlation between lagged explanatory variables and the
residuals. Therefore, we can use the lagged values of the explanatory variables as
instruments.
Standard errors of coefficient estimates are robust to within-bank clustering and
heteroscedasticity. Within-bank clustering may be, among other forms, in the form
of serial correlation of observations for a particular bank and its form can vary from
bank to bank. A limitation on the error term is that it cannot be correlated across
banks. This requirement will be violated if, for example, a period-specific shock
affects the whole sector in a similar fashion. We included year dummies in our
regressions to capture contemporaneous correlation of this sort.
The model is estimated with generalized method of moments. A Pagan-Hall test
of homoscedastic disturbance reveals that the disturbance is heteroscedastic. In the
presence of heteroscedasticity, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the instru-
mental variables (IV) estimator. Therefore, it is preferable to use GMM as opposed
to IV estimator in this setting.  Furthermore, when we have more moment condi-
tions than the number of endogenous explanatory variables, the GMM approach
allows us to make use of moment conditions optimally.
If we denote the parameter estimates of the GMM by λj, λ1 being the coefficient
of the lagged capital, we can obtain the coefficients of the target level of capital
equation as follows: 
(4)
4.4. Results
Estimation results are displayed in Table 4 through Table 7. We treated portfolio
risk and return on equity as endogenous variables in Table 4 and Table 6, whereas
we treated them as exogenous in Table 5 and 7. Instruments start with lag 2 in
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coefficients of the target level of capital equation (Equation 3) are displayed in the
right-hand panel of these tables. The parameter estimates measure how much
effect a change in the first differenced right-hand-side variable has on the first dif-
ferenced left hand side variable. 
Our findings are in line with our predictions from the theory. In particular, lagged
capital has a significant effect on current capital, which shows that the dynamic
model is a good choice in explaining capital. Portfolio risk, the share of deposits and
asset size are negatively correlated with the capital adequacy ratio. On the other
hand, the average capital adequacy ratio of the sector and the growth rate of gross
domestic product are positively correlated with the capital adequacy ratio.
The negative impact of asset size on capital is an evidence of larger banks hold-
ing less capital. This can be explained by the fact that larger banks have more
sophisticated systems to use capital more efficiently. Large banks are also able to
access capital from financial markets at more favorable terms. 
The negative sign of the coefficient of the share of deposits is also reasonable.
As explained in section 2 in detail, banks that have higher ratios of deposits in their
non-equity liabilities have cheaper source of funds and are considered less risky,
which in turn decreases their buffer capital. 
According to the result of our regression analyses, banks that carry a higher port-
folio risk have a smaller capital adequacy ratio. This is a reasonable finding since, by
definition, the capital adequacy ratio is algebraically negatively correlated with risk
weighted assets. Therefore, it can also be expected that the share of risk weighted
assets in total assets is negatively correlated with capital adequacy. Banks with high-
er portfolio risk need to carry more capital to provide a buffer against expected and
unexpected losses.
Banks seem to hold more capital when economic growth is stronger. This is
somewhat counterintuitive. However, banks usually suffer in terms of capital during
periods of economic slowdown in Turkey. Economic growth periods, therefore, are
times for replenishing depleted capital for the Turkish banks. When economic
growth is strong, banks make more profit, and some of this profit contributes to
their capital.
As the average capital of the sector increases individual banks feel that they
should also increase their capital to stay competitive. This makes sense from the per-
spective of a bank operating in the same sector since the capital adequacy ratio of
a bank could serve as a signaling mechanism for market participants.
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in Table 4 and Table 5 and it is positive and significant in Table 6 and 7. We would
expect a negative relationship between this variable and capital adequacy.
However, ROE is not only an indicator of the cost of capital for banks. It is also an
indicator of profitability, and profitability has a positive impact on the amount of
capital that a bank holds, we think the profitability effect surpassed the cost of cap-
ital effect for the banks that are included in our analyses.
In order to test the validity of our assumption on the endogeneity of risk and
return on equity variables, we performed several Hausman tests. Results of these
tests indicate that these variables, jointly and separately, can be treated as exoge-
nous.(3) Treating these variables as exogenous can improve the efficiency of our esti-
mates. As a result, it is possible to obtain smaller standard errors for our estimates.
Table 5 displays the results of GMM estimation when these variables are treated as
exogenous. The results are similar to those in Table 4. All variables that are signifi-
cant in the first specification are significant in this specification and the estimates
are similar in magnitude to those in the first specification. 
We checked for autocorrelation in the error term. Since the residual is first order
related mathematically we find significant negative first order serial correlation. We
also find evidence of second order serial correlation. For the GMM method to pro-
duce consistent estimates, our instruments should start with deeper lags. Therefore,
we used 3rd and 4th lags of the exogenous variables as instruments. Table 6 and
Table 7 display the results from this specification. The difference between Table 6
and Table 7 is that in producing Table 7, we assumed that only lagged capital is
exogenous, since endogeneity tests suggested that we can treat other variables as
exogenous.(4) Our results are similar in these two cases. All of the variables are sig-
nificant in these tables. The magnitudes of the coefficients are also similar in Table
6 and Table 7. The coefficient estimates in these tables are also similar to those in
Table 4 and Table 5, with the exception of return on equity. Instrumenting with
deeper lags rendered the return on equity variable significant.
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(3) The null hypothesis is that the variables tested are exogenous. Test statistic is 0.824 for joint exo-
geneity of risk and return on equity; associated P-value is 0.662. Results for separate exogeneity
tests are similar.
(4) The null hypothesis is that the variables tested are exogenous. Test statistic is 1.265 for joint exo-
geneity of risk and return on equity; associted P-value is 0.531. Results for separate exogeneity
tests are similar.107
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Table 4: GMM results: return on equity and risk treated as endogenous
Table 5: GMM results: return on equity and risk treated as exogenous
(***) significant at 1% level
Estimates are from two-step efficient GMM estimation. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and within group clustering.
Hansen J statistic is 9.8 with associated p-value of 0.46. 
Pagan-Hall statistic is 53.6 with associated p-value of 0.000.
Number of excluded instruments is 13, instruments starting with lag 2.
(***) significant at 1% level; (**) significant at 5% level
Estimates are from two-step efficient GMM estimation. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and within group clustering.
Hansen J statistic is 7.4 with associated p-value of 0.42. 
Number of excluded instruments is 13, instruments starting with lag 2.
Table 6: GMM results: return on equity and risk treated as endogenous
(***) significant at 1 percent level; (**) significant at 5 percent level
Estimates are from two step efficient GMM estimation. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and within group clustering.
Hansen J statistic is 11.7 with associated p-value of 0.47.
Pagan-Hall statistic is 64.1 with associated p-value of 0.000.
Number of excluded instruments is 10, instruments starting with lag 3.5. Conclusion
We estimated a model of capital adequacy for the Turkish banking sector. This
study contributes to the literature by estimating a panel data model of capital ade-
quacy ratio for the Turkish banking sector. It is the first study of this sort for this sec-
tor, to our knowledge. The findings of the empirical study are generally in line with
other empirical evidence from other countries. There are some variables that affect
the capital adequacy ratio differently in Turkey. We think that this can be explained
by the circumstances of the Turkish banking sector in the period covered in this
study. The study covers a period in which the overall economy was expanding and
banks were in the process of recovering from an earlier economic crisis. Therefore,
the results might change in a different time period. On the other hand, the Basel II
framework will be implemented in Turkey in the near future. It will be interesting to
see how these findings change as new capital adequacy regulations introduced by
the Basel II are implemented as this will certainly change the way banks assess the-
ir capital adequacy. 
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Table 7: GMM results: return on equity and risk treated as exogenous
(***) significant at 1% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (*) significant at 10% level
Estimates are from two step efficient GMM estimation. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and within group clustering.
Hansen J statistic is 9.6 with associated p-value of 0.39.
Number of excluded instruments is 10, instruments starting with lag 3.109
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